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Exclusive: Fast Times in the DPRK
Tom Ordeman, Jr.

Author: Tom Ordeman, Jr.

Date Published: 2007-07-20

North Korea has been in the nuclear development business for nearly a half century. FSM Contributing Editor Tom Ordeman, Jr. assesses the threat presented by North Korea to the region and to America. What viable options do we have in countering Kim Jung Il’s power plays? Tom lays it all out for you.

Fast Times in the DPRK

By Tom Ordeman, Jr.

In a speech in early 2002, the President labeled the interconnected web of international terrorism the “Axis of Evil”.  Critics of this rhetoric have not only questioned the severity of this phrase, but also questioned the degree of cooperation between the nations and groups included in the description: pre-war Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.  A closer look at North Korea reveals just how close this isolated nation’s ties to state-sponsored terrorism really are.

North Korea has been a strategic issue for the Western world since the end of World War II (when half of Korea became communist and the other half became capitalist). In the early 1950's, North Korea invaded South Korea, only to be repulsed in a three year police action by a large coalition led by the United States.

The United States posts a large contingent in South Korea, particularly along the demilitarized zone on the thirty-eighth parallel. Although these forces are ostensibly ready to repulse a North Korean attack, their primary role is a political one: while North Korea might attack only the South Koreans, they are far less likely to restart a conventional shooting war with the United States. A couple of minor incidents (most notably the USS Pueblo incident) have occurred between the United States and North Korea in the last fifty years; and while there are periodic incidents between North and South Korean forces, the Korean War has remained an official stalemate since 1953.

An abbreviated review of North Korean missile and nuclear development follows, but here is an extensive report on the history of the DPRK's missile development, and here is an extended review of DPRK nuclear development.

North Korea has been slowly developing nuclear technology since the 1960's, when it initiated its nuclear program using Soviet assistance. It kick-started new and extensive research and development on ballistic missiles during the late 1990's, basing its designs on Soviet SCUD missiles. In 1994, then-President Clinton sent former-President Jimmy Carter to secure a cessation of nuclear development from North Korea; a heavily biased (but factually accurate) article about the failure of Carter's mission can be read here, and another here. In August of 1998, North Korea tested the Taepodong-1 missile, prompting the international community to retaliate with further economic and diplomatic measures. Kim Jong Il agreed to a moratorium on long-range ballistic missile testing, promising that he would stop testing Taepodong-1 missiles. In July of 2006, Kim Jong Il made good on this promise - by test firing a Taepodong-2 missile instead. North Korea has carried out several nuclear tests (and several other possible nuclear tests) over the last couple of years.

The current missile and nuclear capabilities of the DPRK are still limited. Intermediate-range ballistic missiles like the Nodong series (which are primarily variants of existing, proven SCUD designs) seem to be reliable; on the other hand, the North Korean capacity for highly accurate targeting is questionable, as are the reliability and accuracy of the Taepodong series. As for North Korea's actual nuclear warheads, there are indications that they're either somewhat fragile, or possibly just unreliable. Reliable North Korean missile capability would allow DPRK strikes on South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, or American positions in Asia. However, the likelihood of North Korea being able to reliably launch a nuclear first strike on any of the aforementioned targets, let alone the continental United States, is debatable.

Thus, North Korea is an emerging threat as a nuclear power, and an existing threat using conventional weapons. However, North Korea has everything to gain by testing these systems in a very public manner, and almost nothing to gain by using them against its perceived enemies. Although North Korea's national policy is one of extreme militarization, their conventional military would be soundly defeated by the coalition that would almost certainly retaliate after any unprovoked North Korean attack. The bottom line is that these continued tests by the DPRK are international political posturing.

So, why is North Korea doing this? As the world's only remaining Stalinist nation, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is colossally poor. According to a July 2006 article in the Wall Street Journal, North Korea's entire national economic policy is based on using its nuclear program to extort money from the international community. Kim Jong Il believes that his best bet at making money, ostensibly for his country, is by funneling all of his resources into developing nuclear weapons and delivery devices, and then blackmailing the United States, South Korea, and Japan (and anyone else who wants to join in) into giving him economic aid. Now, given that this is the situation, the question becomes: If he's probably not a threat, then why bother holding him accountable at all?  The answer to this question can be expressed in one word: proliferation.

North Korea has a long history of weapons proliferation. During the 1980's, the DPRK supplied variant SCUD-B missiles to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, and reportedly continues to supply them with various SCUD variants to this day. In the 1990's, North Korea supplied Pakistan with ballistic missiles in exchange for assistance in the development of its nuclear program by the A.Q. Khan network; they also supplied missiles to the Libyans. The record on North Korea's illegal arms proliferation is clear following the interdiction of the A.Q. Khan network and the full disclosure of the Libyans. Aside from missile technology and equipment, North Korean nuclear material made it to Libya, although some question exists as to whether North Korea knew about it or not.  Unconfirmed reports also claim that the DPRK may be negotiating a deal to supply the Taepodong 2 series of missiles to Iran.

In short, North Korea's entire illicit weapons program is seen by Kim Jong-Il and his subordinates as a cash cow. They have been using both their missile production capacity and their nascent nuclear program to acquire much-needed funds for years. If they can use it as a scare tactic to extort money from the West, they will. If that fails, they can continue and expand their sales of nuclear technology and ballistic missiles to whomever is willing to pay them.

Speculation on this issue becomes difficult when searching for a solution. One thing is clear: allowing the DPRK to continue on its present course is seen as unacceptable, even by the DPRK’s few allies. Even China and Russia, who have become a consistent diplomatic foil to the United States in recent years, have participated in six-party talks in an effort to get the North Koreans to back down and suspend nuclear development. The international community has imposed increasingly harsh sanctions on North Korea, to the point that it has become one of the most isolated countries in the world. There is some advantage to this, as it makes it more difficult for the DPRK to export weapons; however, this condition can not be counted upon to stop proliferation of illicit arms.

There are few promising military options. A full spectrum invasion would be precarious and disproportionate; not only is much of the developed world’s military strength tied up in Iraq and Afghanistan, but North Korea is heavily militarized, along the same lines as Japan at the end of World War II. North Korean society is built on a massive personality cult, with Kim Jong-Il and his late father at the center. Whether out of adoration or fear, an invading and occupying coalition would have its hands full; not to mention that any invasion would be immediately answered by artillery and possibly nuclear barrages against South Korea (and possibly Japan) by the DPRK.

Strategic bombing is another option. Although it's possible that other facilities exist, the primary North Korean nuclear facility is at Yongbyon. While human intelligence is difficult to obtain, satellite imagery provides additional information on North Korean nuclear activity. Also, covert SCUD launcher reconnaissance and elimination is nothing new.

Recent developments, while far from perfect, have been promising.  North Korea recently discontinued the operation of its Yongbyon reactor following an agreement over energy aid from South Korea and other members of the six-party talks.  Further talks are scheduled for the future in an effort to continue the process of disabling the Yongbyon facility, as well as other satellite facilities within the DPRK.  For the time being, a diplomatic approach looks promising; however, as the German-led diplomatic coalition that tried to talk down Iran proves, diplomacy without a credible and legitimate threat of force to back it up continues to be ineffective, as diplomacy is something that two parties do as an alternative to the use of force. No matter how eccentric Kim Jong-Il may be, any chance of extinguishing his nuclear program once and for all requires him to understand that military, political, and/or economic force can and will be brought to bear on North Korea.

Ironically, part of Kim Jong-Il's paranoia comes from believing that he has more to gain by standing off against the rest of the world than by complying. Why is this ironic? Because there's a very clear and present example that unconditional compliance results in economic and political benefits, as John Bolton pointed out in a 2004 speech in South Korea. Since Libya abandoned its WMD programs in 2003, Western nations have opened embassies, invested in Libya's petroleum infrastructure, and other industries.

Of course, North Korea is only one of several major players in the Axis of Evil, and many other international security issues must be addressed before a comprehensive solution to the complex dilemma of international terrorism can be found.

FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Tom Ordeman, Jr. is a technical writer for a major defense contractor. He holds a B.S. in History and Naval Science from Oregon State University. He specializes in military affairs and international terrorism.

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