Exclusive: Know Thy Enemy: Al Qaeda in the Maghreb


Author: Tom Ordeman, Jr.

Date Published: 2007-09-14


 

A characteristic of al Qaeda’s overall strategy is to gravitate to areas where the population is disaffected, thus easily swayed to participate in terrorist activity. Algeria is one such place. FSM Contributing Editor Tome Ordeman, Jr. delivers a brief history of the strife in Algeria, and how al Qaeda is exploiting the situation.

 

Know Thy Enemy: Al Qaeda in the Maghreb

 

By Tom Ordeman, Jr.

 

Author's Note: The venerable Sun Tzu wrote, "Know thy self, know thy enemy."  Many Americans recognize the influence that various terrorist groups have on foreign affairs; yet few know the basic background and facts about many of these groups. This piece begins a continuing series of articles aimed at familiarizing FSM readers with basic, important information about key terrorist, militant, and insurgent groups, whose regional operations often influence security issues on a global scale. This installment details al Qaeda in the Maghreb, an al Qaeda affiliate operating primarily in Algeria.

 

As Robert Kaplan points out in his 2005 book “Imperial Grunts”:

 

Actually, Economy of Force was a strategy practiced by all the great empires of antiquity, which had prevailing but not unlimited amounts of military power, so that necessity required them to be both light and lethal, leading to a reliance on mobile strike forces and client states, which was particularly the case with Rome.

 

This strategy, sans imperial ambitions, is practiced by the United States in the form of relationships formed with foreign military forces for the purposes of training, equipping, and multinational cooperation. The strategy is also practiced by al Qaeda, particularly in strategic locations throughout the world. The stated goal of al Qaeda is the reestablishment of the Islamic Caliphate, which controlled the whole of the Islamic world until the final dissolution of the Ottoman Empire following World War I (the caliphate itself was dissolved as an office in 1924).

 

Having operated throughout the Middle East, al Qaeda has frequently chosen to support Jihadist operations in regions and nations experiencing political and economic stagnancy. Islamists hope to gain momentum toward accomplishing their ultimate goal through strategic victories in areas vulnerable to terrorism and ideological influence. In the past, al Qaeda enjoyed support from such nations as Sudan and Afghanistan. One nation in which al Qaeda is currently offering its support to anti-government terrorist elements is Algeria.

 

Algeria was held as a French colony from 1830 until the early 1960s. Although Algeria's proximity to France led it to become an integral holding among French territories, the resulting conditions were extremely harsh, and an estimated third of the native Algerian population is reported to have perished during the colonial period. Notably, Algeria served as the homeland of the French Foreign Legion from 1831 until Algerian independence.

 

In 1954, the Algerian National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale, or FLN) initiated a guerilla insurgency aimed at ousting the French from Algerian territory. The ensuing conflict, now known as the Algerian War or the War of Algerian War of Independence, lasted until 1962, and saw intense fighting throughout the country. In the end, a French referendum resulted in independence for Algeria. (“Legionnaire: Five Years in the French Foreign Legion” by Simon Murray is an excellent first hand account of the final years of the Algerian War.)

 

Since the end of the Algerian War, the FLN has dominated Algerian politics. In 1991, first round polls showed significant gains for the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), spurring the Algerian military to suspend elections in a bid to prevent the rise of an extremist government. An anti-government insurgency ensued, during which the most intense fighting occurred between 1992 and 1998.  The armed wing of the FIS disbanded in 2000, after government forces gained the upper hand in the conflict. In 1999, the Algerian military placed Abdelaziz Bouteflika in the presidency through a rigged election; Bouteflika was reelected in a landslide victory during legitimate elections in 2004.

 

In 1998, Hassan Hattab, a regional commander of the Armed Islamic Group/GIA, the military wing of the FIS, broke with the GIA over their policy of targeting civilians. Once the GIA suspended their activities in 1998, Hattab founded a splinter group calling itself the Salafist Group for Call and Combat. The SGCC has carried out numerous attacks in the last several years, focusing primarily on government and Western interests. These attacks included relatively small bombing operations and insurgent strikes against the Algerian government, as well as the high profile kidnapping of a group of European tourists. The SGCC's primary areas of operations have been the eastern area of Algeria, particularly in the Batna and Kabylie regions.

 

In September of 2006, al Qaeda deputy commander Ayman al Zawahiri issued a statement announcing that al Qaeda and the SGCC had aligned with one another. In January of 2007, the SGCC officially changed its name to al Qaeda in the Maghreb, also variously translated as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or al Qaeda in North Africa. Since that time, the group has carried out several high profile attacks; these include a string of attacks against police stations in February, and simultaneous bombings in April at a police station and the prime minister's office that killed more than thirty. In July, the group carried out a car bomb attack that killed ten Algerian soldiers and wounded thirty-five.

 

On September 6th, a bomb exploded in Batna, targeting an imminent visit by President Bouteflika.  The attack killed at least twenty and injured more than one hundred. On September 8th, a truck bomb exploded at a naval barracks in the port of Dellys, killing at least 30. Al Qaeda in the Maghreb claimed responsibility for both attacks.

 

To date, the tactics and scope of al Qaeda in the Maghreb's operations suggest that their support from al Qaeda may be more philosophical than material in nature. Whereas al Qaeda's support to al Qaeda in Iraq and the Taleban results in constant terrorist attacks, al Qaeda in the Maghreb continues only sporadic operations every few months; it is likely, however, that al Qaeda has exercised some influence over the tactics of their Algerian affiliates, evidenced by the initiation of suicide attacks.

 

A hallmark of al Qaeda's global strategy is gravitation to areas in which local populations are disaffected and easily led to participate in terrorist activity. Because of the continuing fallout from the Algerian War, and because of the frustration over the political and military events of the 1990s, Algeria is vulnerable, hence al Qaeda's interest. Further, as Richard Miniter notes in his 2004 book “Shadow War”:

 

Across North Africa, the rough terrain impedes allied forces and the collection of human intelligence. The reach of central governments is minimal and incapable of punishing terrorists. Rebels and warlords can make for useful al Qaeda allies, and local Muslim militants provide a recruiting base. Finally, the severe brand of Islam often practiced in this harsh climate provides al Qaeda with at least the sympathy and often the cooperation of the locals. Al Qaeda thrives in cruel environments like these.

 

As allied forces eliminate al Qaeda safe havens, slowly in some areas and quickly in others, the overall strategy must continually evolve to encompass areas where al Qaeda is likely to find support. Algeria is one of those locations, and aggressively pursuing the al Qaeda affiliate in the region will serve as an important element in the overall strategy of pursuing and destroying the forces that threaten global freedom and security.

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FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Tom Ordeman, Jr. is a technical writer for a major defense contractor. He holds a B.S. in History and Naval Science from Oregon State University. He specializes in military affairs and international terrorism.

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