Exclusive: What Next in Iraq?
Author: Jeff Bearor, (USMC, ret.)
Date Published: 2007-06-15
FSM Contributing Editor Colonel Jeff Bearor (USMC, ret.) outlines three different courses of action in Iraq and explains why one is the best way to go. For some reason, it seems not to be the course we have chosen, and Colonel Bearor speculates as to why.
What Next in Iraq?
Col. Jeff Bearor, (USMC, ret.)
September 25, 2006
The President spoke to the country on the anniversary of 9/11 and again at the UN yesterday. In both addresses he outlined the administration’s current views on Iraq and a way-ahead for the Middle East. I wish I could say I was totally impressed.
When we plan in the military we develop options through a creative process called “course of action” development. Many possible courses of action are outlined that meet the necessary conditions to reach the desired end-state and purpose of the military campaign. These possible “COAs” are thought through and vigorously war-gamed to determine what might go wrong, what might go right, and which COA gets us to the end state with minimum cost in resources including time, national treasure, and (most importantly) lives. It’s a method of thinking through all the myriad possibilities, anticipating challenges and providing commanders the best possible advice before they make decisions.
As I see it there are three COAs for Iraq right now.
COA 1 is, stay the current course. Keep US and coalition troop strength about where it is, continue to limp along with an under resourced program to train the Iraqi Army to defend the Iraqi people from the forces of anarchy, and hope for the right outcome. Not, in many military minds, the best chance for success. As retired US Army General Gordon Sullivan once said “hope is not a method.”
COA 2 is, declare victory, turn the country over to the Iraqis as soon as possible, and bring Americans and our coalition partners home. This might be a viable option forcing the Iraqi government and its new Army to step up to the plate and take their swings. If they win great, if they don’t, then we can say we tried hard but it was meant to be. Not the way we like to do business but there is precedence for this COA.
Then there is COA 3 (there always seems to be three, and only three COAs for some reason), which is to increase American troop strength by about 100,000 ground forces. This would allow us to take charge completely of the security situation on the ground throughout the country and give the Iraqi government the breathing space it needs to form more fully. Additionally our presence would provide a more secure environment so that normal Iraqis could grow their economy, send their kids to schools, and begin to live more normal lives. We’d also be able to better man our training cadres serving to train and advise to the Iraqi Army and security forces giving them the opportunity to be better able to take over when we leave.
Obviously I support COA 3. Once we had an increased force presence on the ground providing real security throughout the country, our government could set a timetable for withdrawal. Some would say that setting a date for withdrawal plays into the hands of the extremists. Not true!
If we have the ability to really chase down the insurgents and terrorists all over the country instead of just pushing them from one area into another we can eliminate the most dangerous rogue elements quickly and keep them from re-emerging. Once Iraqis see we mean business, that we will squash the insurgency, disarm the militias and leave a viable, well trained and equipped security force in place, they’ll be more than happy to point out to us and the Iraqi Army any bad guys who emerge.
A year after establishing our increased US force presence we’d leave. Behind us would be a reinvigorated and secure Iraq with a viable government, a security force able to stamp out any left-over insurgents and control their borders, and an economy growing because of the increased security. At that time we’d leave “Iraq to the Iraqis” as has been said. We’d leave them with a viable chance to turn their country into an Iraqi democracy, what ever that democracy looks like, with the best opportunity for success. At the same time we’d live up to our own stated goals and ideals – ideals that Marines I’ve served with have died for.
Why are we were we are now? My personal opinion is no one will "speak truth to power" as was famously said by General George C. Marshall.
Listen, I may just be a grunt with a Poly-Sci degree – but it seems rather straight forward to me.
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Col.Jeff Bearor (USMC, ret.) is a career Marine Corps officer, the former commanding officer of the Recruit Training Regiment at the US Marine Corps Recruit Depot at Parris Island, SC, and has served as Chief of Staff, Marine Corps Training and Education Command, Quantico, VA.
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FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Col. Jeff Bearor (USMC, ret.)
served more than 30 years on active duty with the U.S. Marine Corps before retiring in January 2006. As an infantry officer he commanded four rifle companies, an infantry battalion and the Recruit Training Regiment at Parris Island, SC. He also served as USMC exchange officer with the British Royal Marine Commandos in 45 Commando Group in Scotland and graduated from their famed Commando Course. He is a military parachutist and diver. He served as a military detailee in the CIA Counter-Terrorist Center, as the Fleet Marine Officer/Force Protection Officer for the U.S. FIFTH Fleet in Manama, Bahrain, and as the Chief of Current Operations, J3 at the U.S. Central Command. Jeff is currently a Research Fellow at the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities working on Marine Corps issues. The views expressed here are his own.
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